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Paper 1 
My initial introduction to the PVHD occurred in early 1980 accompanying the 
AFFTC bioenvironmental engineer while he was conducting a laser safety survey 
of the static cockpit display described in Paper 13. At that time, I was Chief 
of Aerospace Medicine at Edwards AFB and was more interested in the eye hazard 
implications. During our evaluation, I sat in the mock cockpit with the laser 
horizon on and, in turning around to make a seat adjustment, inadvertently 
glanced momentarily with my right eye directly into its beam. The brightness, 
of course, startled me. Though after-images persisted for a brief time, I was 
pleased to find no loss of acuity. (I am myopic and was wearing minus lenses 
at the time.) 
Major Dave Edmondson, then at the USAF Test Pilot School, pointed out the 
principle of the PVHD and urged me to fly the incandescent light device of Vic 
Horton and Einar Enevoldson in their T-37 aircraft at NASA Ames Research Cen-
ter's Dryden Flight Research Facility. One ride was sufficient to convince me 
that this was indeed a "better mousetrap." Light intensity was low requiring a 
dark night for adequate use, but the light PVHD worked as advertised. It pro-
vided excellent attitude information without the pilot having to look at it, 
even with the attitude director indicator (ADI) masked. Unusual attitude recov-
eries were simple, although from steeply banked positions, one might attempt to 
recover by rolling inverted. Precise attitude control was facilitated during 
precision approaches, again with the ADI taped over. One could easily monitor 
attitude with peripheral vision, thus freeing up central vision for tasks requir-
ing acuity, such as monitoring performance instruments. It unquestionably sim-
plified this task. 
Having recently been reassigned to the Air Force Inspection and Safety 
Center as Chief of Life Sciences, I was in a position to analyze USAF aircraft 
mishaps. The following incidents are characteristic of the type that may have 
been prevented by a wide field of view attitude indicator such as the PVHD: 
Two-seat fighter aircraft departed single-ship into a low (500 foot) 
overcast; emerged 15 to 20 seconds later in a 45 0 dive, 90 0 of left 
bank. Wings rolled level and had started pullout just before impact. 
Observation aircraft departed single-ship into a low broken deck 
conducting a weather check; in and out of clouds on downwind, then 
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entered a larger darker cloud. Emerged 10 to 15 seconds later in a 
45 0 dive, 90 0 of right bank. Rolled wings level and had started 
pullout just before impact. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft on night-weather formation sortie was 
wingman in left fingertip descending in cloud, breaking out over 
lightless terrain at about 20,000 feet. The wingman drifted below 
lead, crossing to the right beneath. He called "lost wingman," con-
tinued to roll right, and descended to impact mountains 10,000 feet 
below. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft on a night-weather formation sortie 
called "lost wingman" in the clouds and impacted shortly thereafter. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft, number 4 on a daytime departure into 
weather, entering overcast at about 300 feet AGL. Apparently 
attempting to track and trail his element mates on his radar scope, 
he entered a descending right turn to impact. 
Single-seat interceptor aircraft returning single-ship to land, at 
night, through heavy rainshowers; broke out of a low ceiling left 
of course; quite likely had one or more warning lights. While ang-
ling toward the runway, allowed himself to get too low and struck 
tall trees less than two miles from the runway. Fatigue also a 
factor. 
Cargo craft making a circling approach to an unfamiliar airfield 
in lightless surroundings on a "black-hole" night. During turn to 
downwind, may have mistaken a lighted tower for conflicting traffic. 
Entered inadvertent, overbanked descent to impact. Fatigue also a 
factor. 
Two-seat fighter aircraft on a daytime dogfight mission departed 
controlled flight while defending against a gun pass and descended 
into a hazy undercast. Aircraft emerged at about 1,500 feet AGL 
in a slow spiral. Dual sequenced ejection initiated out of the 
envelope. 
Two-seat fighter aircraft on a daytime mission departed controlled 
flight during an intercept and descended into undercast of heavy 
clouds. Initially thought he had recovered control but then noted 
the ADI rolling at low altitude and wisely ejected in time. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft flying as wingman on a daytime weather 
departure into turbulent clouds. Lead became concerned about a col-
lision and called, "level at 17,000, climbing to 18,000," leaving 
his wingman in an approximate 30 0 left bank. Due to radio static, 
the wingman had misunderstood this call, and by the time he had 
transitioned back inside the cockpit, his ADI was rolling and show-
ing mostly black. He confirmed the unusual attitude of the ADI on 
his head up display (HUD), and managed to begin a recovery as he 
broke through the overcast, pulling over 9g to barely miss the 
rocks. 
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Single-seat fighter aircraft on a night formation radar delivery. 
Went head-down to the radar scope allowing a 2,000-foot descent to 
go undetected, impacting short of the target on run-in line. 
Fatigue also a factor. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft evaluating gunnery techniques on the 
range, daytime, turned toward downwind, channelized attention on 
the weapons delivery computer, failed to catch a descent, and flew 
into the ground. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft, daytime, preparing for a gunnery com-
petition. While on downwind setting up for his third pass, went 
head-down to his weapons delivery computer, failed to monitor a 
slow roll descent, and initiated recovery a fraction of a second 
too late. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft, number 2 on a dark night range mis-
sion. Made a radar laydown pass and pulled off into a climbing 
left turn, during which the flight lead inititated a pre-briefed 
lead change, passing number 2 on his left. Number 2 indicated 
he'd entered clouds, then indicated some problem, most likely 
caution lights. He impacted within 20 to 30 seconds having rolled 
from a climbing left turn to an inverted right dive, 1800 out of 
phase. Misinterpretation of the ADI or more likely, the HUD, was 
suspected. (HUDs are not optimized for instrument flying~ in the 
ordnance delivery mode, the pitch ladder, which is mated to the 
velocity vector (flight path marker), slews allover the face of 
the combining glass - rendering interpretation difficult.) It is 
quite easy to misinterpret an upright climb from an inverted dive 
(Fig. 1). 
Single-seat fighter aircraft leading a number 3 ship to the range 
between cloud decks announced he had a problem and rolled abruptly 
into a hard left turn, presumably to return to base, immediately 
entering clouds. He emerged briefly only to enter lower clouds 
and impacted cloud-covered mountains at a fairly steep dive. There 
was a mismatch between the ADI and the standby attitude indicator, 
which, erroneously, indicated a climb. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft on a single-ship, black-night approach 
through weather claimed spatial disorientation while in the clouds 
in icing conditions from 8 to 4 miles out. Shortly after break-
ing out left of course due to cross-winds, he felt an unfamiliar 
"thump" (possible ice ingestion), neglected to monitor his vertical 
velocity indicator (VVI), struck an approach antenna, lost control, 
and ejected successfully. This pilot was task saturated. 
Bomber aircraft on a night terrain avoidance ordnance~ delivery 
circuit failed to note a slight 1° to 2° descent into slightly 
rising terrain. Ground impact destroyed aircraft. Fatigue also 
a factor. 
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Helicopter was letting down to a terrain avoidance low level, fol-
lowing a night aerial refueling. Failed to catch mis-set altitude 
warning and impacted terrain. 
Cargo plane returning from predawn exercise, permitted a 1° des-
cent to go unnoticed for about one minute, impacting the surface. 
Fatigue also a factor. 
Cargo plane shooting an approach to minimums in low ceilings and 
blowing fog. Attempted to go visual prematurely, failed to detect 
an excessive VVI, and hit short, causing major damage. 
Reconnaissance aircraft shooting approach to minimums in blowing 
snow. Landed short. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft on night intercepts called "Tally-ho" 
while belly up to his target; had apparently mistaken surface 
lights for his target. Lost over 11,000 feet and impacted near sur-
face lights. Fatigue also a factor. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft leading a night two-ship to the range. 
Coming off his initial pass, no spot from the bomb was seen. Turn-
ing to downwind, it appeared the pilot was trying to troubleshoot 
the "no" release. Allowed a descending turn to go undetected and 
impacted. Chronic fatigue a factor. 
Single-seat aircraft flying as wingman on aerial refueling sortie. 
Following top-off lead, called he was passing to assume lead, and 
also told wingman to ensure proper function of navigation equip-
ment. While head-down checking his navigation equipment, the wing-
man drifted up and into lead and was killed. 
Trainer, solo, attempted to cross a high thunderstorm, flamed 
out engines, descended into clouds, apparently became disoriented 
while attempting restart, and crashed before completion of ejec-
tion sequence. 
Trainer, solo, flamed out at altitude, descended into clouds, 
became disoriented attempting restart, and ejected safely. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft lost control above an undercast, 
became disoriented attempting recovery in the clouds, and ejected 
safely. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft pilot making a daytime route weather 
abort became task saturated trying to locate his element mates on 
radar while changing TACAN channels; inattentive to his altimeter 
and VVI for nearly one minute during which his aircraft descended 
nearly 4,000 feet to impact. Fatigue also a factor. 
I ----- -----------= ------
Single-seat fighter aircraft flying as wingman on a daytime depar-
ture into low clouds, entering clouds on the right wing. Within 
15 to 20 seconds, both aircraft emerged through the 1,000-foot cloud 
bases in a steep dive, the wingman now on the left wing. Lead 
pulled hard; both aircraft struck vegetation. 
Single-seat fighter aircraft at night descended through a 2,OOO-foot 
cloud deck breaking out over a lightless black-hole across which a 
lone interstate highway ran. As he attempted to level off, his 
"ears" told him he was climbing vertically, yet the highway reflec-
tion off the top of his canopy told him he was in a steep dive. He 
fought hard to make the ADI indicate straight-and-Ievel but admits 
he came very close to ejecting. After a minute or so, he was able 
to see city lights on the horizon, and immediately his disorienta-
tion vanished. 
Single-seat attack aircraft pilot climbing into weather on a route 
abort focused all his attention on the ADI to the exclusion of the 
airspeed indicator, stalled, lost control, and ejected. 
Characteristics common to these incidents included night, weather, forma-
tion, false horizons, and situations requiring head-down time. These condi-
tions led to either or both of two general types of spatial disorientation 
(8DO): that which alerts the pilot that something is amiss (such as the leans 
or pilot's vertigo), and that which does not alert him that anything is wrong. 
The aircraft is not on rails, and unless one pays attention to his attitude, the 
aircraft may insidiously and subliminally roll and/or pitch somewhat into unex-
pected, unanticipated, and unwanted attitudes. Many pilots refer to this latter 
form of SDO as "mis"orientation. Because the pilot is not alerted that anything 
has changed, he may postpone his instrument cross-check for too long a time. 
The insidious nature of "mis"orientation renders it every bit as lethal as the 
recognized form, if not more so. It would appear that the PVHD would be most 
helpful in preventing the unrecognized type of disorientation, though hopefully, 
it would also help him cope with the recognized form as well. 
Other situations which would appear to benefit from the PVHD might include: 
Naval operations around the carrier, such as traps and catapult launches. 
Helicopter operations, particularly hovering over loose material such as 
dust or snow in which the rotor-wash kicks up particle concentrations sufficient 
to block visibility. 
Operations with special vision restricting devices that compound the dif-
ficulty of maintaining attitude. 
Needs of the pilot: flying under conditions in which the pilot can visually 
reference the true surface, or the true horizon, the only instrument needed is 
an airspeed indicator. In flying under conditions where he cannot use the sur-
face as a height reference, he may also need an altimeter. However, if he is 
flying in conditions denying valid references to the plane of the surface or to 
the true horizon, his most important instrument becomes some form of attitude 
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indicator. Prior to the development of artificial horizons, pilots could main-
tain relatively level flight by mentally integrating the turn and slip indicator 
(needle and ball) with airspeed and altimeter. With the advent of the artifi-
cial horizon, the pilot now had one instrument that integrated for him all the 
i nformation required for attitude. Thi s single instrument has become far and 
away the most important gauge to the pilot and flying in instrument meteorologi-
cal conditions. Many military aircraft incorporate a type of attitude indicator 
whi ch also provides heading information and is known as the attitude director 
indicator ar ADI. In order to maintain awareness of his flying situation 
(s i tuation awareness (SA)) pilots are trained to employ a cross-check of those 
i nstruments providing critical control parameters. This composite instrument 
c r oss-check is commonly a scan that refers to the ADI more frequently than to 
any other instrument. When a pilot feels disoriented, h e is commonly instructed 
to focus the majority of his attention on the ADI and to force it to indicate 
str aight-and-level flight. The larger the ADI, the easier this is to do. Large 
ADI s should be or should become the rule in the design of instrument aircraft. 
Whereas it may be permissible to miniaturize some instruments, this does not 
app ly to the ADI. The ADI is one instance where big is definitely better. 
In aircraft subject to night/weather formation flying, it would appear ideal 
to provide an artificial horizon that is wide enough to be monitored out of the 
cor ner of the wingman's eye. Preferably, it should also occupy a prominent 
location at or near the center of the instrument panel. A large, prominent, and 
commanding ADI is all the more important in the presence of design features that 
distract and disorient pilots - such as a head position high i n a fishbowl 
can opy prone to glare and reflections. It should also enable him to transition 
quickly from outside to inside. 
Theoretically, the Malcolm Horizon PVHO should serve admirably as a wide FOV 
att itude indicator, thus reducing spatial "mis"orientation and disorientation, 
easing and expediting the transition to instruments, and significantly reducing 
cockpit workload. 
Anxious to see the laser PVHO in action, I requested a ride in the USAF/TPS 
RF-4C aircraft. Major Terry Lutz and Captain Blaine Hammond had been conducting 
f li ghts with the rear cockpit hooded. I was more interested in noting how the 
PVHD fared in visually disorienting situations, such as in the weather or in 
for mation. I was also interested in noting how it fared in brighter conditions, 
such as above cloud, below a cirrus deck, or while head-down as in a range pat-
ter n. Hence, we flew unhooded with Blaine Hammond piloting. 
The PVHO worked as advertised providing continuous attitude information 
thr ough 360 0 rolls and to its stops on loops; however I had several criticisms: 
The quality of the horizon projection needed improvement; bright dots 
wer e substituted for the horizon at lower power settings, and when the line 
appeared to connect the dots, it wavered continuously. I would prefer a nice 
cri sp, sharp, unwavering line as I had seen with Lyle Schofield's model. 
The horizon line was only 18 inches wide; it did not seem that it could 
be monitored "subliminally" by the peripheral visual fields when head-out as in 
fly ing formation, or when head-down. However, it was much easier to "sneak a 
peek" at it, head-out or head-in. 
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This brings me to an anecdote regarding the PVHD. The PVHD was installed 
in the front cockpit of the single-seat night attack (SSNA) A-10 aircraft as 
described in Paper 9. It was projected onto the instrument panel as shown on 
page 95 of these proceedings. While conducting tests over a range one pitch-
black night, the front-seat pilot initiated pulloff from an ordnance delivery 
pass. There was some problem with the ordnance, which he began to troubleshoot 
by looking back and forth from the left multifunction display to the armament 
control panel on the center pedestal. During the ensuing 10 to 15 seconds, he 
looked back and forth 4 to 5 times across the position of the PVHD. He had 
initiated a wings-level climb, but now, with his attention diverted from moni-
toring his flightpath, the aircraft began a slow roll to the right reaching over 
90 0 of bank. The PVHD worked as advertised, rotating downward and counterclock-
wise, then moving back toward center as the aircraft began to descend. Though 
the pilot was looking back and forth across the PVHD, he never caught the unu-
sual attitude. Finally, the safety pilot in the rear cockpit noticed the altim-
eter begin to unwind and alerted the front-seater to watch his altitude, not 
his attitude - for he had not caught the unusual attitude either. 
Though this is only anecdotal, it indicates to me, at least, that one can-
not depend on the PVHD to automatically alert oneself to odd attitudes anymore 
than the real horizon. One must devote some attention to his attitude. The 
advantage of the PVHD is that this can be done easily with the peripheral visual 
fields. There may, however, be some implications for training in its proper 
use. 
Cockpit compatibility cursory evaluation: Following the conference, sev-
eral participants (Einar Enevoldson, an Ames Dryden test pilot; Art Kennedy of 
Garrett of Canada, which manufactures the Malcolm Horizon; and I) evaluated the 
PVHD at night, in three aircraft cockpits at Ames Dryden: F-111, F-15, and F-16. 
F-111. With plenty of instrument panel available, the PVHD appeared 
quite compatible. Canopy reflections were no problem. Centering roll axis pro-
duced the roll-pitch illusion seen in the T-37 aircraft. If used in the F-111 
aircraft, it would seem wise to center the roll axis in front of the pilot. 
F-15. There appears to be sufficient panel to display the PVHD, although 
the pilot's line of sight is somewhat higher. Monitoring is possible during 
head-out simulating formation flying, as well as going head-down. There were 
occasional annoying reflections off certain instruments, though none off the 
HUD or canopy. Interestingly, the PVHD does not show up when projected onto 
multifunction display (MFD) surfaces, although this could apparently be correc-
ted with a different surface coating. 
F-16. Though F-16 aircraft instrument panels vary somewhat from block to 
block, they're all similar when it comes to the Malcolm Horizon: 
Surface on the upper portion of the panel is limited and that surface 
which is available is broken up by the HUD control panel which juts out 5 to 
6 inches from the plane of the instrument panel. 
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The PVHD does appear to be compatible with the F-16 airplane cockpit 
if it were projected below the HUD control panel over the bottom row of 
instruments (airspeed indicator, ADI, and (in block 10) the altimeter). 
Here it would appear to be quite useful to a pilot while he is head-down. 
Aimed too low, the PVHD strikes the pilot's knees which jut up above 
displays on the center pedestal, due to the tilt-back seat. 
Canopy reflections might be a problem. PVHD occasionally generated 
reflections. 
Summary: Personal experience with the PVHD indicates that it should have 
great promise in easing cockpit workload, improving situational awareness, and 
reducing spatial disorientation. 
It should not be assumed that the PVHD will automatically cue the pilot to 
his attitude without some training or exposure. Some measure of attention needs 
to be devoted to attitude although this can easily be accomplished by the peri-
p h eral visual fields without tying up central vision. 
The PVHD would appear useful in any aircraft that flies in spatially dis-
orienting/misorienting conditions, such as night, weather, or formation. It 
would appear to be particularly useful in aircraft, that by their design, are 
especially disorienting in such circumstances. 
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